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1 Introduction
The point of departure for a discussion of what
macroeconomic policy can or cannot do depends on
the economic context. In the real world, assuredly,
there are hundreds of different economic contexts.
That is why one size of macroeconomic policy does
not, and cannot, fit all. Purely for expository
purposes, however, this article shall distinguish just
two archetypes of economic context, ‘developed’
and ‘developing’ countries. ‘Developed country’ here
means one in which (1) the economy is fully
monetised; (2) wage employment is the dominant
form of employment; (3) institutions of free
collective wage bargaining are in place; and (4) social
protection exists for workers’ stochastic risks – job
loss, industrial accident, ill health and incapacity in
old age, but not for the co-variant risk of mass
unemployment. ‘Developing country’ here means
one where (1) the economy is less than fully
monetised, because subsistence and barter economy
still prevails in part; (2) wage employment is a
minority form of employment, the dominant form
being self-employment with associated low levels of
capital per head and low levels of labour
productivity; (3) institutions of free collective wage
bargaining, if they are in place, have a restricted
impact on conditions of employment; and (4) social
protection against stochastic risks is very limited,
even for the minority who are wage workers. One
can think of these two stylised contexts as the
extremes of a spectrum. Most real world contexts
can be found somewhere between these extremes.1
This article begins with the analysis of the
‘developed country’ archetype. Then, in the second
half, the article turns to the ‘developing country’
archetype.
2 Labour markets, macroeconomics and
employment policy in ‘developed countries’
Where did macroeconomics come from? Why is it
necessary at all? Before the publication of Keynes’
General Theory in 1936, employment was analysed by
looking at separate labour markets – the markets for
the services of butchers, bakers and candlestick
makers. Lionel Robbins’ Theory of Wages (1934) was
the classic statement of this approach, in which total
employment was the sum of employment generated
in each labour market by the forces of supply and
demand for labour services operating there. The
recommended employment policy was to permit
wages to fluctuate freely, so that each labour market
cleared, because there was thought to be no form
of government intervention that could improve on
that outcome.
Keynes invented his macroeconomics (his general
theory of employment, interest and money) in order
to demonstrate that, when one considers aggregate
demand for output, and its derived aggregate demand
for labour, and the aggregate supply of the factors of
production, capital and labour, the policy
recommendation of non-intervention did not hold. His
basic intuition was that there were interactions
between apparently separate labour markets and
apparently separate markets for goods. When the
wages of candlestick-makers declined, so did their
demand for the products of butchers and bakers, who
found that they were accumulating excess stocks.
Fewer butchers and bakers would then be employed,
further reducing the demand for candlesticks. This
employment multiplier effect, if taken into account,
showed that market forces tend to intensify any
negative shock to employment. Keynes further
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showed that, given certain assumptions about the
response of investors to the interest rate and the
money supply, either (a) the economy can reach a
short-run equilibrium position where some
unemployment is involuntary, i.e. where some workers
would prefer to work at the prevailing wage, if they
could; or (b) the economy remains in a permanent
disequilibrium of underused resources.2 In either
situation, he argued, it would be justified for the
government to intervene in order to add to aggregate
demand.3 It should continue do so until the economy
reached full employment. Thus Keynes overturned the
recommendation of government inaction.
The difficulty with this active employment policy is
that it is not easy to define what is meant by aggregate
full employment. Keynes gave this definition:
We have full employment when output has risen
to a level at which the marginal return from a
representative unit of the factors of production
has fallen to the minimum figure at which a
quantity of the factors sufficient to produce the
output is available.
(Keynes 1978: 15–16)
His definition implies that the marginal disutility of
labour (i.e. the labour supply constraint) is what sets
the upper limit to potential output. So Keynesian
macroeconomic theory included an upper bound on
aggregate employment, beyond which further
increases in aggregate demand produce no extra
output, but merely cause a rise in the general level of
prices. However, in practice it was very hard to
identify this upper bound to employment. The
concept of the marginal disutility of labour is of very
little use to practical policymakers, not least because
the marginal disutility of labour itself depends on
one’s level of real income.
Keynes sometimes settled for the more prosaic
notion that full employment meant that everyone
who wanted a job had one. That raised the question
of what is meant by ‘a job’. Even in developed
countries, where wage labour is the dominant form
of employment, jobs are not homogenous. The
required hours of work differ; the nature and
intensity of effort differs; the payments and rewards
systems differ. In addition, a minority form of
employment is self-employment, in which each
individual attempts to set their tasks, regulate the
quality of performance and set the price to be
charged for it. Given this variety, what could ‘full
employment’ mean? Joan Robinson quickly
perceived the difficulty and that, using the criterion
of labour productivity, some forms of self-
employment might be seen as being ‘disguised
unemployment’. Her favourite example of this was of
the match-seller in the Strand (Robinson 1962: 86).
In developed countries, this vagueness about the
point of full employment fed into an important
policy problem, of which Keynes was certainly aware.
A government committed to maintaining full
employment within a free wage bargaining system
would sooner or later generate an inflationary spiral.
The unemployment of candlestick-makers that
would otherwise be caused by their union’s success
in raising their money wages would be eliminated by
the policy of maintaining a high level of aggregate
demand. Since there was no longer any
unemployment penalty for pushing up money wages,
the butchers’ and bakers’ unions would press for
compensating wage increases. A general rise in the
level wages would raise the general price level,
which would raise wages, and so on. This indeed
turned out to be the economic experience of many
developed countries that followed neo-Keynesian
policies in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1975, for example,
Britain had an inflation rate of 15 per cent and the
government introduced price controls and subsidies
on loaves of bread.
3 Inflation targeting and public expenditure
planning in developed countries
Since those days, the institutions of macroeconomic
policy in many developed countries have been
reformed to improve the management of
inflationary expectations. Reforms include allowing
central banks ‘independence’ to control monetary
policy, thereby removing from politicians the
temptation to buy short-term social peace at the
expense of long-term inflation, and the setting of a
precise inflation target at a low positive level in place
of an inevitably imprecise employment target. These
reforms have impacted favourably on the machinery
for planning public expenditure. Public expenditure
comprehends shoes and ships and sealing wax, and
cabbages and kings – plus all the public sector’s
spending on social security measures. The planning of
public expenditure is thus necessary, although
obviously not sufficient, for the effective delivery of
health, education and social support services.
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Best practice in the planning of public expenditure
now takes place by projecting the framework of the
national accounts, based on (a) forecasts of key
parameters and (b) the observance of two self-
imposed constraints. The parameters that are
forecast are: the future growth rate of the economy;
the likely yield of major direct and indirect taxes; and
of the future course of interest rates, which affects
the cost of servicing government debt. Additionally,
the expenditure totals have to satisfy two
constraints, or fiscal rules. One applies to the
national accounts category of current spending, and
the other applies to the national accounts category
of investment spending. On current spending, ‘the
golden rule’ is that, over the economic cycle, the
government will borrow only to invest, and not to
fund current spending. This means that, over the
economic cycle, current spending must not exceed
current revenue. On investment spending, ‘the
sustainable investment rule’ is that, over the
economic cycle, public sector net debt will not
exceed 40 per cent of GDP.4 Taken together, the
forecasts and the observance of these two fiscal
rules as constraints sets the upper limit for the
projection of total managed expenditure.
The underlying forecasts now have to be audited by
an independent agency, which has to judge whether
they are well-founded and prudent. This judgement
must be made public, to prevent the government
from making unduly favourable growth, tax yield and
interest rate forecasts simply in order to justify
excessive public spending. Moreover, the question of
whether or not the fiscal rules have been complied
with also has to be verified independently by another
agency. The adoption of these safeguards has curbed
the political manipulation of the planning numbers.
The delegation of the task of inflation control to an
independent central bank results in an important
simplification of the task of planning public
expenditure. This measure formalizes the
government’s commitment to maintaining a low
inflation rate, by giving the central bank discretion to
use monetary policy to hit the low inflation target. It
removes the temptation for a government to add to
inflationary pressures in its wage bargaining, because
doing that would trigger interest rate rises that
would raise the cost of its own borrowing. It also
removes the opposite danger, that a government
would use cash limits on public spending in order to
achieve a pre-determined target level of pay
settlements for those who work in the public sector,
including those who provide social protection as
employees of the health and social security services.
If, by such methods, inflation can be kept to low
annual percentage rise, it becomes easier to forecast
future interest rates, and makes it possible to adopt a
public expenditure planning system based on
constant prices, simply because the difference
between expenditure at current and constant prices
will be kept very small.
4 Macroeconomic dynamics and economic
growth
Keynes’s general theory of employment was
concerned with the short run period of one year to
18 months. The original policy problem about the
macroeconomic dynamics of growth was how to
maintain full employment over the long run, the
period when the size of the labour force changes as
a result of population growth, and saving behaviour,
assumed to determine investment behaviour, might
also change. If technology were assumed to be
unchanging, there seemed to be a problem of knife-
edge instability, which could lead to a severe crisis of
contraction in a developed economy as it grew
(Harrod 1951).
The neoclassical growth model, due to Robert Solow
and Trevor Swan, proposed to resolve this problem
by allowing the technology of production to vary.
The strategic modification of the Harrod–Domar
model was to change the capital-output ratio from a
constant to a variable. The central question of policy
thus became, how is this choice of capital intensity
to be made? Solow assumed that the choice would
be taken by competitive entrepreneurs in a
decentralised competitive market system, although
the features of these markets, including the labour
market, do not appear in the model. The growth rate
of labour, for example, is assumed to be the same as
the growth rate of population.5
The economists of Cambridge (UK) criticised the
Solow–Swan model, questioning the possibility of
valuing a heterogeneous set of capital goods when
interest rates vary, and thus the validity of the claim
that the interest rate is determined exclusively by the
declining marginal productivity of capital, a feature
valid only in a one-commodity model. Underlying this
technical critique was an alternative vision of the
economy in which profit-making decisions of
capitalist firms are the driving force, and the
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fundamental economic problem is the allocation of
surplus output to ensure reproduction and growth. In
such an economy, consumers are not sovereign.
Rather, individual worker-consumers occupy a variety
of positions of subordination, according to their class
places in the division of labour. The labour market
assigns individuals to a hierarchy of occupational
roles. These roles are stratified by economic reward,
social recognition and political empowerment. The
differentiation of labour rewards is decided by the
relative bargaining strength of the individual
employee and of shareholders of the firm or their
managers. Legal property rights allow the firm to
appropriate the surplus from production, after paying
out labour rewards. The saving and spending
behaviour of the different social classes and the
animal spirits of the investing capitalist firms are the
determinants of the rate of profit. However, this
alternative account of how the capitalist system
works had little impact on macroeconomic policy.
5 Labour markets, macroeconomics and
employment policy in ‘developing countries’
Joan Robinson widened her claim that the match
seller in the Strand was manifestation of disguised
unemployment to include its equivalent in
developing countries – the peasant in India whose
land holding was too small to keep the whole family
busy.6 Agricultural employment provides the greater
part of all employment still in many developing
countries and much of this employment is still
family-based, non-monetised and subsistence-
oriented. Here, as Arthur Lewis noted, ‘everybody
has some sort of a job, however great the pressure
of population’ (Lewis 1966: 76–7). In the rural areas,
land gets sub-divided, but the shrinking farms do not
shed their labour in order to preserve the claim of all
family members to a share of the produce. In the
urban areas, the better-off have a social obligation to
hire domestic servants – cooks, cleaners, gardeners,
drivers and so on. Those who cannot get such
positions fall back on petty trading and small scale
manufacture in the informal sector. The returns to
family farm labour, domestic service and informal
activities are very low. Occupations or livelihoods
within all three segments of the economy tend to
be allocated by personal patronage, rather than by
impersonal labour markets.
The poor articulation of family-based agriculture and
the urban informal sector with the capitalist sector
of the economy weakens the reach and relevance of
macroeconomic policy. In a disaggregated economy,
the concepts of aggregate demand and aggregate
supply necessarily have a much more restricted
purchase. Keynes’s multiplier effect of government
investment on employment, income and
consumption is frustrated by the fact that poor
people want to spend much of their additional
income on food, and the agricultural sector has a
limited capacity to respond to additional demand.
Government intervention to expand employment is
thus impeded by the existence of an agricultural
supply constraint, whose effects are manifested in
rising prices rather than increases of real income and
employment. Perverse effects are possible. For
example, a rise in the money income of
agriculturalists may induce them to expand their own
food consumption and thereby reduce the size of the
surplus that they market to the capitalist sector, with
consequent upward pressure on urban food prices. In
summary, typically inflation appears before extra
government investment has had its desired
employment-creating impact.
Does that imply that the government should
undertake fiscal expansion, despite accelerating
inflation? I do not think so. Inflation certainly can
divert extra resources into the hands of the
government, but only if it is unanticipated and if it is
temporary. After that, higher levels of inflation
progressively deter people from holding money,
interrupting monetisation of the economy and the
growth of financial intermediation, while the
resource transfer to the government progressively
declines. Conceivably, inflation could be held constant
at some level or other, but a constant rate of
inflation over a long period is quite pointless. It does
not even cause redistribution. It merely complicates
everybody’s accounting.
The macroeconomic problem in a developing
country therefore revolves around investing as much
as possible as productively as possible in order to
promote growth, and particularly in order to relax
the agricultural supply constraint, while avoiding
inflation. There is an upper limit to investment, but it
is set by the country’s capacity to borrow. It is a
brutal fact about the world financial system that no
country’s government can, for any length of time,
increase its external debt at a rate faster than the
rate of growth of its economy. If it tries to do this,
sooner or later a debt crisis will intervene.
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6 Macroeconomic dynamics and economic
growth in developing countries
The neoclassical growth model predicted a
convergence of countries’ levels of income per capita,
while in reality divergence can be observed. When
the convergence prediction is made conditional on
allowing savings and population growth rates to vary
among countries, more than half of the observed
divergence in per capita incomes can be attributed to
differences in these two variables (Mankiw et al.
1992). Yet this rehabilitation of the neoclassical
model is not wholly convincing. Conditional
convergence might be the result of structural
change, the transfer of resources from a low
productivity sector (agriculture) to a high productivity
sector (industry), rather than a decline in the
marginal product of capital (Thirlwall 2002: 33–4).
Since structural change cannot be represented in a
one-sector model, one needs to turn to at least a
two-sector model to generate a process of
economic growth and the transition that produces
structural change.7
Arthur Lewis’s model of economic development with
unlimited supplies of labour comprises a capitalist
sector (where capitalists hire wage labour) co-existing
with a subsistence sector (where labour is not
fructified by capital). Growth occurs as capitalists,
both private and public, re-invest their profits and
draw additional labour out of the subsistence sector
at a constant real wage rate somewhat higher than
the subsistence wage. This process continues until the
labour market in the capitalist sector tightens, and the
real wage rate begins to rise, gradually choking off
further growth. This kind of dualistic model contains
implications for changes in the sector composition of
output, the functional distribution of income and
urbanisation, assuming that the subsistence sector is
rural and the capitalist sector is urban.
The model can be extended to explain the growth of
an urban informal sector. The fixed margin by which
the capitalist wage exceeds the subsistence wage
draws into urban areas job seekers who cannot yet
be employed in the capitalist sector. While awaiting
their opportunity, they engage in low-capital
production or service activities. Open urban
unemployment, of the type that is found in
developed country labour markets, occurs only when
the relatively well off, and often well educated, are
able to finance themselves through a period of job
search.
However, the Lewis model does not explore the
possibility of an agricultural supply constraint, which
could lead to a movement of the inter-sector terms
of trade against the capitalist sector, reducing its
profits and choking off growth. More seriously, like
the neoclassical model, the Lewis model assumes
that the investment of the capitalist sector is
perpetually supply-constrained, so that the
generation of its own savings automatically translates
into investment. This assumption finesses the
question of whether increased purchasing power in
the subsistence sector is ever necessary to motivate
investment, as some under-consumption theorists
have argued. It also forecloses the question how
foreign trade stimulates growth, and how exports
create additional demand that permits the reaping
of economies of scale – a central theme in the work
of Nicholas Kaldor and his followers.
7 Inflation and public expenditure planning in
developing countries
Given the less diversified structure of their
economies, developing countries are more exposed to
the effects of exogenous shocks from abroad. These
can come as rises and falls in the price of export
commodities and consequent changes in their terms
of trade. Obviously, mono-product exporters will be
more vulnerable to income volatility than economies
where, as one export price falls, another is rising. So
policies of export diversification should provide an
antidote in the future. They do not help the
immediate policy problem, however. What to do in
the meantime? The economy can either be adjusted
to the exogenous shock, or not. In the latter case,
there will be no problem if the shock is merely
temporary, and it quickly neutralises itself. If the shock
is not temporary, adjustment can be postponed by
increased aid or increased borrowing from abroad.
The possibility of increased aid depends on the
elasticity of the budgets of foreign governments,
while increased foreign borrowing will sooner or later
run into the buffers of a debt crisis when the rate of
increase of such borrowing exceeds the rate of
growth of the economy. When no more aid increases
are forthcoming and the limits of foreign borrowing
have been reached, adjustment will take place
inevitably. The only remaining question is whether the
government attempts to manage the adjustment
process, or whether it allows it to happen chaotically.
If the government wants to manage the process of
adjustment to exogenous shocks, it needs an
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effective framework for planning and implementing
its own activities and expenditures, and those of the
rest of the public sector. The ability to plan public
expenditure effectively is vital for another reason: the
composition of public spending influences the
degree to which a unit of economic growth benefits
the poor. Investment in infrastructure in the
subsistence sector, for example, is a key factor in
raising agricultural productivity, raising the standard
of living and making economic growth pro-poor
(World Bank 2005).
Just as in developed countries, it is much easier to
plan public expenditure and deliver public services in
a context of low inflation. Such planning must be
done either in current or in constant prices. If there
is inflation and the aim is to control the public
sector’s demand for real resources, it is a mistake to
plan future spending at current prices. Depending on
what the rate of inflation eventually turns out to be,
totals in current prices might lead to more or less in
terms of the use of real resources. However, on the
other hand, if spending is planned in terms of
constant prices, i.e. having made allowance for a
forecast future inflation rate, this suggests that the
government intends to be passive in the face of
anticipated inflation. Moreover, managing
expenditure at constant prices insulates the
government from the consequences of its own
decisions on the pay of public sector workers. The
constant price method of managing expenditure
becomes unworkable once annual inflation passes
the double-digit level (Pliatzky 1982: 122–75). Only
when inflation is kept very low is the difference
between current and constant prices negligible,
causing the dilemma of whether to plan in current
or constant prices to disappear.
Since governments in developing countries do not
have discretion to control all areas of public
spending, the total of public expenditure should not
be the only target, for example to achieve a desired
PSBR/GDP ratio. The combination of targeting the
total of public expenditure while not being able to
control some portion of it can have the perverse
result of letting the pressure for more current
spending foreclose opportunities for more
government investment – say, in rural roads or other
agricultural infrastructure – even when cost-benefit
analysis indicates that it would be socially profitable.
The government must be vigilant to prevent a
chronic contraction of the share of public investment
to GDP and a crisis of under-investment in public
services, which will weaken the impulses of pro-poor
growth. One of the main weaknesses of structural
adjustment policies in developing countries has been
their failure to prevent this happening.
While neoclassical growth models assume that
investment is determined simply by the availability of
savings, and the Lewis model assumes that domestic
capitalists will constantly re-invest from their profits,
the Cambridge (UK) vision more realistically argues
that the entrepreneurial decisions of large capitalist
firms drive the economic system. In the context of
globalisation, this means the investment decisions of
large multinational corporations. In conjunction with
the behaviour of the government, they will be highly
influential in determining the quantity and quality of
formal employment that gets created in developing
countries in the next few decades. In general, and
with some exceptions, multinational investment
creates modern sector jobs with labour standards
that are, though low by Western standards, high by
comparison with those prevailing in the domestic
rural sector. In the recent past, however, much of
their investment has flowed to a relatively small
number of middle-income countries, and Africa has
been relatively neglected, apart form investments in
natural resource extraction industries, which create
little employment and tend to have negative effects
on the management of the public finances.
What can national governments do to reverse this
situation? Much liberalisation of trade and investment
regimes has already taken place, and the gains from
further moves in this direction may not be great. On
the other hand, there are many aspects to maintaining
an attractive environment for investment, not least of
which is lowering perceptions of business risk. Even in
the most attractive environment, however,
multinational companies will not invest unless they can
identify some particular business opportunity that they
wish to pursue. These opportunities will probably be
greater if the government can develop, in consultation
with its own private sector, an active investment and
growth strategy, something that is still possible within
the interstices of the WTO trade rules. In the end,
however, multinationals will simply invest where they
believe they can find the highest risk-adjusted rate of
return.
Given that 95 per cent of the world’s R&D is done in
the industrial countries, the overall effect of R&D in
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non-industrial countries depends importantly on
whether and how R&D is transferred to them. If the
knowledge produced by R&D is fully shared when
countries trade, levels of income per head will tend to
converge, but if R&D knowledge is not shared, then
living standards of the trading countries will
progressively diverge. This underlines concerns about
poor countries adopting passive technology policies –
policies of economic stabilisation and liberalisation that
merely clear away existing obstacles to flows of trade
and foreign investment. Such passive policies, while
often an improvement on previous policy regimes, do
little to build indigenous capacity to share the technical
knowledge embodied in new imports and new FDI.
Countries like South Korea and Taiwan that have
converged towards industrial country living standards
in recent years have certainly not relied on passive
technology policies. Neither have they relied solely on
trade protection. South Korea in particular developed
a strategy of dirigisme, in which institutions to share
information between business and government and
coordinate plans were stiffened by selective incentives
in the form of interest rate subsidies and restrictions
on FDI designed to favour domestic firms.
8 Conclusions
There are seven main points that need to be
emphasised:
1 Right from the start, Keynesian macroeconomics
was designed for the specific economic context of
the typical developed country. The economy was
fully monetised and the workers were wage
workers with rights of free collective bargaining and
entitlements to social protection against stochastic
risks. Its justification for fiscal expansion hardly
applies in developing countries having a different
economic context – heterogeneity of different
forms of employment, and poor articulation
between a capitalist and a subsistence sector.
2 In developed countries, the pursuit of the
inherently vague objective of full employment,
combined with a free wage bargaining system,
gradually sparked an inflationary spiral. This
undermined the credibility of an employment
target for macroeconomic policy, and promoted
inflation targeting by an ‘independent’ central
bank. New policy institutions have created a
superior environment for the management of
public expenditure, including expenditure on social
protection.
3 The original dynamic form of Keynes’s
macroeconomics – the Harrod–Domar model –
had some unsatisfactory instability features that
were eliminated by the Solow–Swan assumption
of variable aggregate capital intensity. It remained
unclear whether the appropriate capital intensity
would be achieved by firms operating in
decentralised markets, or by central planning. In
either case, what was at issue was the amount of
capital with which each worker should be
endowed, rather than the quality of their
employment.
4 The Solow–Swan model drew forth, in the
Cambridge capital controversies of the 1960s, an
alternative vision of the functioning of capitalism,
which included the idea of a socially stratified
labour market and of income generation and
distribution being driven primarily by the decisions
of large firms – at the global level, by
multinational companies.
5 In developing countries, the presence of surplus
labour in the subsistence sector and the absence
of unemployed non-labour resources together
made Keynesian remedies for unemployment
largely irrelevant. Additions to government
investment rapidly induce inflation without
generating extra employment.
6 There are few convincing economic arguments
for tolerating more than a very low level of
inflation. Effective public expenditure planning is
essential if governments are to be able to
manage the process of adjusting to external
shocks and to pursue a strategy of pro-poor
growth. Inflation higher than a few percentage
points per year makes the task of planning public
spending and public service delivery arbitrary and
chaotic.
7 Multinational investment, though large and
generally representing a step forward in job
quality in the formal sector, is highly concentrated
on a few countries and there are no sure-fire
methods of attracting it to a particular location.
However, within WTO trade rules it is still
possible for poor countries to pursue active
technology policies through government–private
sector cooperation, and success in doing so may
be a magnet for foreign direct investment.
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Notes
1 For a good survey of the different reasons why
different countries originally adopted
macroeconomic policies, see Hall (1989).
2 I say here ‘either/or’ to make clear that there are
two conflicting interpretations of what Keynes
wrote. I might have said ‘both/and’, because both
can be found in different passages of The General
Theory. For further discussion, see Laidler 2006:
39–57.
3 The mode of government intervention that
Keynes advocated was to initiate public works
(building houses, roads, etc.) financed either from
new borrowing, or from tax revenue accumulated
to pay off the public debt. Neither method
necessarily involved running a budget deficit,
although deficit financing later became associated
in the public mind with Keynesian
macroeconomics.
4. Thus Keynes’ plea, first made in 1924, for the
separate control of the current and the capital
budget, was finally realised in the UK in 1997.
5. Swan suggested that the choice capital intensity
could be made centrally by a national planning
organisation. (Interestingly, Swan subsequently did
work for the Indian Planning Commission,
whereas Solow got involved with the American
Keynesians who advised President Kennedy.)
6. Joan Robinson lived in India in the mid-1920s,
when Austin Robinson was the tutor employed by
the Maharajah of Gwalior.
7. It is interesting to note that, when Keynes
discussed the Russian economy, which was in his
day a developing economy, he did so in terms of
the interaction of two sectors – the one-seventh
of the population constituting the industrial
proletariat and the six-seventh constituting the
rural peasantry (Toye 1993: 241–8). The main thrust
of his comments was to criticise Soviet
government policies of ‘urban bias’ – achieved by
maintaining a dual exchange rate and depreciating
the domestic currency by the excessive printing of
money.
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